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United States Court of Appeals 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 
 
 
Argued September 5, 2018 Decided March 12, 2019 
  
No. 17-1149 
 
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, 
PETITIONER 
  
v. 
 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, 
RESPONDENT 
 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, LOCAL 721, 
CTW, CLC, 
INTERVENOR 
 
 
Consolidated with 17-1171 
 
 
On Petition for Review and Cross-Application for 
Enforcement 
 of an Order of the National Labor Relations Board 
 
 
J. Al Latham Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. With him 
on the briefs was Cameron W. Fox.  
 
Jessica L. Ellsworth and Joel Buckman were on the brief 
for amicus curiae The American Council on Education and 
seven other education associations in support of petitioner. 
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Heather S. Beard, Attorney, National Labor Relations 
Board, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Peter 
B. Robb, General Counsel, John W. Kyle, Deputy General 
Counsel, Linda Dreeben, Deputy Associate General Counsel at 
the time the brief was filed, Usha Dheenan, Supervisory 
Attorney, and Joel A. Heller, Attorney. John H. Ferguson, 
Assistant General Counsel, entered an appearance. 
 
Maria Keegan Myers argued the cause for intervenor 
Service Employees International Union, Local 721, CTW, 
CLC. With her on the brief were Glenn E. Rothner and Hannah 
S. Weinstein.  
 
Michael S. Wolly was on the brief for amicus curiae The 
American Association of University Professors in support of 
respondent.  
 
Before: TATEL and PILLARD, Circuit Judges, and 
SENTELLE, Senior Circuit Judge. 
 
Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge TATEL. 
 
TATEL, Circuit Judge: Almost four decades ago, in 
N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672 (1980), the 
Supreme Court sustained the National Labor Relation Board’s 
extension of the protections of the National Labor Relations 
Act to the faculty of private universities. The Court concluded, 
however, that the full-time faculty seeking recognition in that 
case qualified as managerial employees exempt from the 
NLRA’s coverage because, as at other “‘mature’ private 
universit[ies]” where “authority . . . is divided between a 
central administration and one or more collegial bodies,” the 
faculty at Yeshiva exercised “effective[] control” over central 
university policies. Id. at 680, 683. In this case, the Board, 
applying standards it set forth in its post-Yeshiva decision, 
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Pacific Lutheran University, 361 N.L.R.B. 1404 (2014), ruled 
that the full- and part-time non-tenure-track faculty of the 
University of Southern California’s (USC’s) Roski School of 
Art and Design exercised no effective control over university 
policies and, as non-managerial employees, were therefore 
eligible to join a union. USC petitions for review, arguing, 
among other things, that the Pacific Lutheran framework 
conflicts in several different ways with Yeshiva. Because we 
agree that one aspect of the Board’s decision here—namely, its 
extension of Pacific Lutheran’s “majority status rule” to 
faculty subgroups—conflicts with Yeshiva, we grant the 
petition in part and deny the Board’s cross-application for 
enforcement. 
I. 
Designed by Congress to quell “industrial strife” and its 
harmful effects on the “channels of commerce,” the National 
Labor Relations Act aimed to stabilize industry by vesting 
industrial workforces with new labor rights. See Pub. L. 
No. 74-198, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449 (1935) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.). Congress sought to “redress the 
perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and 
management . . . by conferring certain affirmative rights on 
employees and by placing certain enumerated restrictions on 
the activities of employers.” American Ship Building Co. v. 
N.L.R.B., 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965). “The central purpose of 
[the NLRA] was to protect employee self-organization and the 
process of collective bargaining from disruptive interferences 
by employers.” Id. at 317.  
A. 
Years after Congress passed the NLRA, the Supreme 
Court issued two opinions central to the question before us in 
this case. First, in N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Division of 
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Textron Inc., the Court held that although the NLRA, by its 
terms, covers all employees (except for supervisors and other 
exemptions immaterial to this case, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(3), 
(12)), it nonetheless excludes “managerial” employees from its 
protections. 416 U.S. 267, 283–84 (1974). As the Court 
explained, Congress “regarded [managers] as so clearly outside 
the [NLRA] that no specific exclusionary provision was 
thought necessary.” Id. at 283. 
Second, in N.L.R.B. v. Yeshiva University, the Court 
clarified for the first time that the NLRA covers university 
employees and provided guidance about when university 
faculties constitute managerial employees exempt from the 
NLRA’s coverage. See 444 U.S. at 682–90. In doing so, the 
Court distinguished between the “type of management-
employee relations that prevail in the pyramidal hierarchies of 
private industry” and those that exist within a “typical ‘mature’ 
private university” where “authority . . . is divided between a 
central administration and one or more collegial bodies” 
composed of academic faculty. Id. at 680. Together, 
administration and faculty may manage a university through a 
system of shared governance—“‘the process by which various 
constituents (traditionally governing boards, senior 
administration, and faculty . . .) contribute to decision making 
related to college or university policy and procedure.’” 
American Council on Education’s (“ACE”) Br. 4 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Association of Governing Boards of 
Universities and Colleges, Shared Governance: Changing with 
the Times 3 (Mar. 2017)). It was respect for the “shared 
authority” that can be embedded in university governance, 
paired with the need to safeguard the protections afforded by 
the NLRA, that guided the Court in Yeshiva. See 444 U.S. at 
680. 
4
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The facts of Yeshiva are straightforward. A union seeking 
to represent most of the university’s full-time faculty filed a 
representation petition, requesting that the Board certify it as 
the faculty’s bargaining agent. Id. at 674–75. The university 
argued that the faculty were managerial, but the Board found 
otherwise. Id. at 678. Grounding its decision in the NLRA’s 
protection of professional employees—a designation 
encompassing employees engaged in “predominantly 
intellectual” work, 29 U.S.C. § 152(12)—the Board found that 
members of Yeshiva’s faculty were professional employees 
who enjoy the NLRA’s protections, rather than exempted 
managerial ones. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 678.  
The Supreme Court disagreed. It pointed out that 
“professionals, like other employees, may be exempted from 
coverage . . . under the judicially implied exclusion for 
‘managerial employees.’” Id. at 681–82. In non-university 
settings, moreover, the Board classifies as exempted 
managerial employees those individuals who “represent[] 
management interests by taking or recommending 
discretionary actions that effectively control or implement 
employer policy.” Id. at 683. Therefore, the Court explained, 
the same general analysis must guide the Board in the 
university setting. Id. at 686. As relevant here, the Court 
dismissed as inconsistent with these precedents the Board’s 
arguments that faculty members were non-managerial because 
they engaged in collective decision making (true of many 
corporate managers working through boards and committees) 
and because they enjoyed less than “ultimate” authority (held 
in corporate settings by the board of directors). Id. at 684–85, 
685 nn. 20–21.   
Instead, the Court looked to the principles underlying the 
managerial exception—namely, that managers fall outside the 
NLRA’s protections because “an employer is entitled to the 
5
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undivided loyalty of its representatives.” Id. at 682. Unions 
divide that loyalty, and the fear of compromised loyalty was 
“particularly acute” at a university like Yeshiva, where the 
faculty exercised “pervasive[]”—even “absolute”—control 
over academic matters. Id. at 679, 686, 689. “The controlling 
consideration in this case,” the Court explained, “is that the 
faculty of Yeshiva University exercise authority which in any 
other context unquestionably would be managerial.” Id. at 686. 
Elaborating, the Court stated:  
[The faculty’s] authority in academic matters is 
absolute. They decide what courses will be offered, 
when they will be scheduled, and to whom they will be 
taught. They debate and determine teaching methods, 
grading policies, and matriculation standards. They 
effectively decide which students will be admitted, 
retained, and graduated. On occasion their views have 
determined the size of the student body, the tuition to 
be charged, and the location of a school. When one 
considers the function of a university, it is difficult to 
imagine decisions more managerial than these. To the 
extent the industrial analogy applies, the faculty 
determines within each school the product to be 
produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and 
the customers who will be served.  
Id.  
With the Yeshiva faculty’s “absolute” academic authority 
as a backdrop, the Court explained to the Board—in language 
important to the issue before us today—how to identify 
managerial faculty in future university cases. Faculty qualify 
as managerial when they exercise “effective recommendation 
or control” over central employer policies. Id. at 683 n.17. 
Faculty exercise such control when a university “depends on 
6
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the [faculty’s] professional judgment . . . to formulate and 
apply crucial policies constrained only by necessarily general 
institutional goals,” particularly when the university “requires 
faculty participation in governance.” Id. at 689.  
That said, the Court took care to avoid “sweep[ing] all 
professionals outside the [NLRA] in derogation of Congress’ 
expressed intent to protect them.” Id. at 690. Faculty are 
protected by the NLRA if their “decisionmaking is limited to 
the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which 
they have been assigned.” Id. Further cabining its holding, the 
Court recognized that faculties are heterogeneous, and that 
non-managerial subsets may exist within a faculty entrusted 
with managerial authority. For instance, the Board might draw 
a “rational line” between “tenured and untenured faculty 
members.” Id. at 690 n.31. Such a distinction turns on “how a 
faculty is structured and operates.” Id. In saying this, the Court 
made clear that “this is a starting point only, and that other 
factors not present here may enter into the analysis in other 
contexts.” Id.  
B. 
For several decades following Yeshiva, the Board, when 
determining a given faculty’s managerial status, applied a 
totality-of-the-circumstances approach informed by the 
contours of that case. See, e.g., American International 
College, 282 N.L.R.B. 189, 190–202 (1986) (discussing at 
length whether the faculty at issue fell “within the scope of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in [Yeshiva]”). But in LeMoyne-
Owen College v. N.L.R.B., 357 F.3d 55 (D.C. Cir. 2004), we 
found the Board’s approach inadequate. There the Board had 
classified the full-time faculty of a small private institution in 
Memphis as non-managerial. Id. at 55–56, 60. Although the 
Board had relied on the fact that circumstances at LeMoyne-
7
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Owen were similar to those at other colleges where it had 
classified faculty as non-managerial, we were concerned that 
the Board failed to “discuss or even mention a single one of the 
precedents on which the College relied.” Id. at 60. Ending our 
analysis before reaching the managerial status of the college’s 
faculty, we observed that, although the Board’s totality-of-the-
circumstances approach followed naturally from Yeshiva’s 
“long list of relevant factors” paired with “the exquisite variety 
of academic institutions across the country,” the Board must 
provide an “adequate explanation for the result it reached in 
this case.” Id. at 57, 61. We instructed the Board to delineate 
“which factors are significant and which less so, and why” in 
managerial-faculty determinations. Id. at 61. Doing so, we 
explained, would afford faculty, universities, and reviewing 
courts “predictability and intelligibility” concerning the 
Board’s “[application of] the test to varied fact situations.” Id.; 
see also Point Park University v. N.L.R.B., 457 F.3d 42, 50 
(D.C. Cir. 2006) (reiterating this requirement in another faculty 
case). 
 The Board endeavored to satisfy LeMoyne-Owen in 
Pacific Lutheran University. Unlike Yeshiva, which involved 
full-time faculty, Pacific Lutheran concerned a faculty 
subgroup—specifically, full-time “contingent” (non-tenure 
eligible) faculty. 361 N.L.R.B. at 1417. Drawing on its “30-
plus years applying Yeshiva” and echoing the Supreme Court’s 
language, the Board used Pacific Lutheran as a platform to 
launch a new test designed “to answer the question whether 
faculty in a university setting actually or effectively exercise 
control over decision making pertaining to central policies of 
the university such that they are aligned with management.” Id.  
Under the Pacific Lutheran framework for determining 
whether faculty qualify as managerial, the Board “organize[s] 
[its] review of faculty decision-making into five general areas”: 
8
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academic programs, enrollment management policies, 
finances, academic policies, and personnel policies and 
decisions. Id. The Board classifies the first three as “primary” 
and the last two as “secondary.” Id. at 1420. Although faculty 
participation in these areas takes various forms, under the 
Pacific Lutheran framework the Board trains its focus on 
participation through service on university committees, which 
specialize in a given field and then propose policies to the full 
faculty or to the university’s administration. See id. at 1424–28 
(consistently analyzing faculty participation by looking to 
faculty committees).  
Again echoing Yeshiva, the Board then considers whether 
the faculty exercise “actual control or effective 
recommendation” authority over each of these five areas. Id. 
at 1421. The test for “effective” control is demanding: 
“recommendations must almost always be followed by the 
administration. Further, faculty recommendations are 
‘effective’ if they routinely become operative without 
independent review by the administration.” Id. (internal 
citation omitted). Intent on ensuring that faculty exercise 
“actual—rather than mere paper—authority,” Pacific Lutheran 
requires “specific evidence” of the process by which the 
administration adopts faculty recommendations. Id. Under 
Pacific Lutheran, the Board looks at “both the structure of 
university decisionmaking and where the faculty at issue fit 
within that structure, including the nature of the employment 
relationship.” Id. at 1421–22. Relevant distinctions include 
“tenured vs. tenure eligible vs. nontenure eligible” and “regular 
vs. contingent” faculty members. Id. at 1422. Rather than 
requiring that managerial faculty control some set number of 
decision-making areas, Pacific Lutheran calls for a holistic 
review of the control exerted over the five areas. See id. at 1423 
(noting that to determine managerial status the Board will 
assess faculty’s control “over those areas”). 
9
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Beyond these context-specific inquiries, and central to this 
case, Pacific Lutheran sets a bright-line “majority status rule” 
under which a committee’s actual control or effective 
recommendation authority over a particular decision-making 
area may be ascribed to faculty only if they constitute a 
majority of that committee: “[i]f faculty members do not exert 
majority control, we will not attribute the committee’s conduct 
to the faculty.” Id. at 1421 n.36.  
Applying this framework to the situation at Pacific 
Lutheran, the Board determined that the contingent faculty 
were non-managerial. Although the university had recently 
allowed contingent faculty to sit on committees, no such 
faculty members had yet joined a committee and, in any event, 
it appeared that they would have had no “right to vote within 
their respective divisions, schools, or constituent departments.” 
Id. at 1424, 1427–28. Contingent faculty did participate in and 
have a vote at the faculty assembly, but the Board characterized 
the assembly as “little more than a conduit to transmit 
previously agreed-upon recommendations to the 
administration” and observed that contingent faculty 
comprised only about twenty percent of the faculty assembly’s 
average attendees. Id. at 1428. According to the Board, the 
nature of the contingent faculty members’ employment 
relationship with the university also counseled against a finding 
of managerial status. In contrast to Yeshiva, where the 
university “require[d] faculty participation in governance,” 444 
U.S. at 689, the Pacific Lutheran administration rarely 
discussed with contingent faculty its expectations for their 
university service, such as committee participation, see Pacific 
Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1423. Contingent faculty had to 
renew their contracts annually and received minimal 
institutional support (such as funding for professional 
development or research). Id. 
10
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In considering whether faculty held a majority of 
committee seats, the Board left uncertain whether the majority 
status rule applied to the contingent faculty only or to the 
faculty as a whole. Even if contingent faculty members sat on 
committees, the Board observed, “they would be a minority on 
the . . . committee[s] as their membership is currently 
structured.” Id. at 1428. Because the faculty as a whole 
constituted a minority on all of these committees, id. at 1424, 
however, the significance of this observation was unclear.   
Two Board members—Phillip Miscimarra and Harry 
Johnson—separately dissented in part. They “generally 
agree[d]” with the Board’s “admirable effort” to craft distinct, 
workable decision-making areas. Id. at 1430 (Miscimarra, 
Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part), 1441 
(Johnson, Member, dissenting). Uncertain about how the 
Board would weigh the “primary” and “secondary” areas in 
future cases, however, the dissenters believed that “substantial” 
authority in secondary areas—unaccompanied by effective 
control over any of the three primary areas—may sometimes 
be sufficient to trigger managerial status. Id. at 1429–30 
(Miscimarra, Member, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also id. at 1441–42 (Johnson, Member, dissenting).  
The dissenters focused primarily on Pacific Lutheran’s 
“treatment of authority, control, and effective 
recommendation” authority, which they considered “too 
onerous and inflexible.” Id. at 1430 (Miscimarra, Member, 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). According to the 
dissenters, the Pacific Lutheran framework demands too much 
because it requires that the administration “almost always” 
follow faculty recommendations. Id. at 1430 (Miscimarra, 
Member, concurring in part and dissenting in part), 1443 
(Johnson, Member, dissenting). “[B]y failing to consider the 
actual, diverse processes of university business operations and 
11
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governance,” Johnson argued, Pacific Lutheran “raised the bar 
for establishing managerial status of faculty to an unattainable 
height.” Id. at 1442–43. He also believed that the Board had 
fashioned “a false dichotomy” when it held that committees 
exercise effective control only if administrators routinely 
accept the committees’ recommendations and do so without 
independent review. Id. at 1443–44. Such a rule, he contended, 
flouts the ideal of universities as “places rich in dialogue” 
between the administration and faculty. Id. at 1444.  
C. 
The University of Southern California, a large private 
university in Los Angeles, has twenty-two schools, some 6,600 
faculty, and between 30,000 and 40,000 students. One of these 
schools, the Gayle Garner Roski School of Art and Design 
(“Roski”)—the venue for the dispute before us—offers 
undergraduate and graduate degrees in fine arts and critical 
studies, among others. See University of Southern California 
(“USC”), 365 N.L.R.B. No. 11, at *7 (Dec. 30, 2016). In 2015, 
the Service Employees International Union, Local 721 
(“Union”) petitioned to represent Roski’s full- and part-time 
non-tenure-track faculty. Id. at *5. 
Reprising the battle lines drawn in Yeshiva, USC 
contended that the Roski non-tenure-track faculty were 
managerial, and the Union disagreed. In a decision adopted by 
the Board without opinion, the Regional Director, applying the 
Pacific Lutheran framework, found the Roski non-tenure-track 
faculty non-managerial. See id. at *1, *18.  
The Regional Director began by addressing several issues 
left unresolved in Pacific Lutheran. She first confirmed what 
the Board had hinted in that case: to exercise effective control 
over a committee, the faculty subgroup seeking recognition—
not just the faculty as a whole—must hold a majority of 
12
Journal of Collective Bargaining in the Academy, Vol. 0, Iss. 14 [2019], Art. 29
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss14/29
13 
 
committee seats. “[E]ven if the faculty on [either committee] 
could be said to actually or effectively control decisionmaking 
. . . , I would not attribute that control to the nontenure track 
faculty at issue here, as they do not constitute a majority of 
either committee.” Id. at *16. Second, although Pacific 
Lutheran left ambiguous whether, for a committee to exercise 
effective control, the administration must “almost always” 
accept a committee’s recommendations and those 
recommendations must “routinely become operative without 
independent review,” Pacific Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1421, 
or whether just one or the other would do, the Regional 
Director indisputably required both: “The Board also clarified 
that for faculty recommendations to be ‘effective,’ the 
administration must ‘almost always’ adopt the 
recommendations, and do so ‘routinely’ without independent 
review.” USC, 365 N.L.R.B. at *15. Third, the Regional 
Director determined that exercising effective control over one 
secondary area “alone” is insufficient to trigger faculty 
managerial status. Id. at *17. By affirming the Regional 
Director’s decision, the Board has, in effect, adopted these 
interpretations as its own. See id. at *1 n.1 (“The Regional 
Director’s decision properly applied [Pacific Lutheran].”). 
Applying this interpretation of Pacific Lutheran, the 
Regional Director classified the Roski non-tenure-track faculty 
as non-managerial. For purposes of determining effective 
control, the Regional Director centered her discussion around 
a dozen or so university-wide committees and other USC 
faculty bodies, including the Roski school-level faculty 
council, that USC contends provide faculty with opportunities 
to weigh in on university governance. Id. at *15–18. The 
committees conduct studies, write reports, and make 
recommendations to either the Academic Senate or the provost. 
Id. at *8. The University Committee on Curriculum, for 
instance, approves, rejects, or modifies every proposed USC 
13
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course, program, major, minor, and degree offering. Id. at *9, 
*15. Although the Committee on Finance and Enrollment has 
made only a few recommendations, those recommendations 
have involved significant issues, including the creation of a 
university-wide plan to address graduate student enrollment, 
whether to maintain a holistic review process for undergraduate 
student admissions, and the payout rate of USC’s endowment. 
Id. at *10, *16–17. Other committees make recommendations 
on academic programs, teaching guidelines, software upgrades, 
grading policies, appointments, promotions, and tenure 
decisions. Id. at *8–13.  
Most USC university-wide and school-specific 
committees are open to all faculty members, including non-
tenure track, though non-tenure-track faculty are excluded 
from decisions concerning tenure. Id. at *11. Committees are 
almost 100 percent faculty, although some faculty also have 
administrative appointments. Administrators occasionally sit 
“ex officio” on committees where they have no vote. See id. 
at *8–13.  
Looking at all committees relevant to each of the five 
decision-making areas, the Regional Director determined that 
USC had failed to show that the faculty serving on these 
committees exercised effective control over any decision-
making area. Id. at *18; see also Pacific Lutheran, 361 
N.L.R.B. at 1427 n.65 (noting that the party asserting 
managerial status assumes the burden of proof). In support, she 
found that USC had failed to provide “specific evidence,” as 
required by Pacific Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1421, of the type 
of review the administration conducted of the committees’ 
recommendations before accepting them. See USC, 365 
N.L.R.B. at *15–18. She also found that the testimony 
concerning the work of some committees was vague, see id. at 
*15, 17–18, as was the testimony about the decision-making 
14
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authority of other committees, see id. For still other 
committees, she found that they had offered too few 
recommendations to characterize their recommendations as 
“routinely” followed. See id. at *16.  
In further support of her conclusion that the Roski non-
tenure-track faculty exercised no effective control, the 
Regional Director found that the nature of their “tenuous 
employment” relationship “limit[s]” their role at the university. 
Id. at *18. Though non-tenure-track faculty are eligible to join 
any committee and make up about three-fourths of the USC 
faculty, they represent a minority on almost every committee. 
Id. at *7–9. They receive little to no institutional support in the 
form of funding, evaluations, or other career guidance; “[i]n 
fact, [non-tenure-track faculty witnesses] testified that 
administrators in their departments or schools have never met 
with them to discuss expectations about their teaching, their 
scholarship or artistic work, or their service to the University.” 
Id. at *8.  
Following her discussion of most every committee 
(including all committees in the three primary areas), the 
Regional Director also found that, even if the relevant 
committees exercised effective control, “nontenure track 
faculty do not constitute a majority of [those] committee[s].” 
Id. at *17. Therefore, “they cannot be found to possess any 
managerial control.” Id. 
Upon finding both that no committee exercised effective 
control and that the Roski non-tenure-track faculty held a 
minority of seats on the key committees, the Regional Director 
concluded that USC had “failed to establish that the full-time 
and/or part-time nontenure track faculty at . . . the Roski School 
actually or effectively exercise control over decision making 
pertaining to central policies of the university.” Id. at *18. As 
15
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noted, on a request for review, the Board adopted the Regional 
Director’s opinion in full. Id. at *1 & n.1.  
 Member Miscimarra, one of the Pacific Lutheran 
dissenters, again disagreed. Asserting that the Board holds 
managers in other industries to a lower standard, Miscimarra 
faulted the Board for ascribing managerial status to only those 
faculty with “unreviewable authority.” Id. at *2 (Miscimarra, 
Member, dissenting). He also believed that the Court in 
Yeshiva had rejected the idea that possessing a majority of 
committee seats was a prerequisite for exercising effective 
control over a committee. He put it this way:  
[Yeshiva] held that a faculty member may possess 
managerial authority even though he or she cannot 
individually establish policy separate from the 
committees on which he or she serves. Similarly, 
faculty members in an individual department or 
program may be managerial, even if as a group they 
are a minority of the total faculty and are outnumbered 
and outvoted on every issue.  
Id. at *3–4. In Miscimarra’s view, extension of the majority 
status rule to determine the managerial status of a faculty 
subgroup conflicts with “the principle of collegial managerial 
authority that the Supreme Court recognized in Yeshiva.” Id. 
at 3. 
Following the Regional Director’s decision and the 
Board’s adoption of it, the Roski non-tenure-track faculty 
voted to form a bargaining unit represented by the Union. 
When USC refused to bargain—an unfair labor practice under 
the NLRA, see 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5)—the Union filed a 
complaint with the Board. USC acknowledged its refusal to 
bargain, and challenged the certification on the grounds that 
Pacific Lutheran conflicts with Yeshiva and that the Roski non-
16
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tenure-track faculty in fact exercise managerial authority. The 
Board granted summary judgment to the Union. See University 
of Southern California, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 89, at *1 (June 7, 
2017). 
In its petition for review, USC makes three basic 
arguments. First, it argues that several elements of the Pacific 
Lutheran framework, as applied in this case, conflict with 
Yeshiva: its requirement that a faculty subgroup must hold a 
majority of committee seats in order to exercise effective 
control through a committee, its standard for “effective” 
control, and its classification of the five decision-making areas 
as primary or secondary. Whether the Pacific Lutheran 
framework comports with Yeshiva is an issue of first 
impression given that the university in Pacific Lutheran never 
petitioned for review and that no other circuit has yet 
considered the question. Second, USC argues that, contrary to 
LeMoyne-Owen, the Pacific Lutheran framework fails to 
provide a workable standard to determine the managerial status 
of faculty. And third, even assuming the validity of the Pacific 
Lutheran framework, USC argues that the Regional Director 
lacked substantial evidence to classify the Roski non-tenure-
track faculty as non-managerial.  
In considering USC’s challenges, we defer to the Board’s 
judgment, born of its expertise, so long as its decision is 
“consistent with controlling precedent,” based on “substantial 
evidence,” and neither “arbitrary” nor “capricious.” 
International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 147 v. 
N.L.R.B., 294 F.3d 186, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A); N.L.R.B. v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 
U.S. 775, 786 (1990) (explaining that because “the NLRB has 
the primary responsibility for developing and applying national 
labor policy,” courts will uphold any rule that is “rational and 
consistent with the [NLRA], even if we would have formulated 
17
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a different rule had we sat on the Board” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
II. 
We begin with USC’s argument that the Pacific Lutheran 
framework—and consequently, the decision at issue here—is 
“[in]consistent with controlling precedent,” i.e., that it conflicts 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Yeshiva. But as even its 
dissenters acknowledge, Pacific Lutheran represents an 
“admirable effort” by the Board to tame a thicket of case law 
that touches on numerous interrelated features of the faculty 
experience at universities. Pacific Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 
1441 (Johnson, Member, dissenting). And for the most part, 
that effort succeeds. There is, however, a major problem.  
Under Pacific Lutheran, as interpreted by the Board in this 
case, a faculty subgroup seeking recognition exercises effective 
control over a decision-making area through its participation 
on a committee only when that subgroup constitutes a majority 
of the committee. See Pacific Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1421 
n.36; USC, 365 N.L.R.B. at *16. This rule, which we shall refer 
to as the “subgroup majority status rule,” is critical because, as 
discussed above, see supra at 9, the Board generally looks to a 
faculty’s authority at the committee level when determining 
whether the faculty exercise effective control over Pacific 
Lutheran’s five decision-making areas.  
USC first claims that the subgroup majority status rule 
resurrects the theory, foreclosed by Yeshiva, that faculty can 
attain managerial status based only on authority wielded 
individually, as opposed to authority shared collectively with 
others. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 685 & n.21 (criticizing the 
theory as “flatly inconsistent” with Board precedents that credit 
managerial authority to “supervisors who work through 
committees”). But in neither Pacific Lutheran nor here did the 
18
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Board run afoul of that precise holding. Indeed, the Board 
agrees that faculty can exercise managerial authority 
collectively. See Respondent’s Br. 37 (“Faculty who constitute 
the majority of a committee can be managerial based on their 
service on that committee, even though the authority they 
exercise there is collective.”). The extension of Pacific 
Lutheran’s majority status rule to faculty subgroups instead 
reflects the Board’s belief that a subgroup, acting collectively, 
is unable to exercise managerial authority through a committee 
when that subgroup holds a minority of committee seats.  
Assuming that understanding of the Board’s subgroup 
majority status rule, USC next argues that the rule “simply 
disregard[s]” the contributions that minority subgroups can 
make to university governance. Petitioner’s Br. 34. Under the 
majority status theory, USC continues, even when a university 
draws “no distinction” between faculty subgroups “in their 
roles in faculty governance,” including situations where the 
subgroups “all participate in the effective management of the 
University,” the Board will “arbitrarily say that one category 
must be in the majority[,] . . . necessarily . . . render[ing] the 
other category non-managerial—when in fact, all are 
managerial.” Id. at 38 (emphases omitted). Because a 
subgroup’s “ability to invoke the rights or protections of the 
[NLRA] should not hinge on whether some other group of 
faculty control or effectively recommend university policy,” 
the Board’s response goes, it would be inappropriate to deny a 
subgroup the NLRA’s protections when an entirely different 
group of faculty, concerned about advancing its own priorities 
rather than the subgroup’s, runs the show. Respondent’s Br. 35 
(emphasis in original).  
In our view, the Board’s subgroup majority status rule 
rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Yeshiva. To 
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explain why, we return to the Court’s opinion and specifically 
to three key themes.  
First, as noted above, the Court drew a sharp distinction 
between the “pyramidal” hierarchies characteristic of private 
industry and the faculty “bodies” at universities. Yeshiva, 444 
U.S. at 680. “[T]he authority structure of a university does not,” 
the Court explained, “fit neatly within the statutory scheme we 
are asked to interpret,” and for that reason, “the Board has 
recognized that principles developed for use in the industrial 
setting cannot be ‘imposed blindly on the academic world.’” 
Id. at 680–81 (quoting Syracuse University, 204 N.L.R.B. 641, 
643 (1973)). In the “pyramidal” industrial arena, the Board 
looks to whether individuals, or groups of individuals, exercise 
managerial authority. Id. at 680. By contrast, the Court in 
Yeshiva returned time and again to the question of whether the 
“faculty” as a body—as opposed to individual professors or 
subgroups—exercises managerial authority. To the Court, the 
“controlling consideration” was that the “faculty at Yeshiva 
University exercise authority which in any other context 
unquestionably would be managerial.” Id. at 686 (emphasis 
added). “The ‘business’ of a university is education,” the Court 
explained, “and its vitality ultimately must depend on academic 
policies that largely are formulated and generally are 
implemented by faculty governance decisions.” Id. at 688 
(emphasis added). Continuing its focus on the “faculty” as a 
body, the Court observed that “[t]he university requires faculty 
participation in governance”; that “Yeshiva and like 
universities must rely on their faculties to participate in the 
making and implementation of their policies”; and that “[t]he 
faculty participate in University-wide governance through their 
representatives on an elected student-faculty advisory council.” 
Id. at 675–76, 689 (emphasis added).  
20
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These repeated references to the “faculty” as a body are 
not linguistic accidents; they are central to the Court’s 
reasoning. Take the Court’s discussion of the bedrock principle 
underlying the managerial exception: that employers deserve 
the loyalty of employees who exercise discretionary authority 
over central employer policies. Id. at 687–88. Highlighting that 
the faculty functions as a single body, the Court observed that 
if, consistent with principles of shared governance, the 
university “depends on the professional judgment of its faculty 
to formulate and apply crucial policies,” then the university 
deserves those employees’ “undivided loyalty,” which in turn 
triggers managerial status. Id. at 682, 689 (emphasis added). 
The Court’s analysis turned not on an aggregation of the power 
delegated to a series of individuals or a mosaic of subgroups—
the focus of the Board’s subgroup majority status rule—but 
rather on the role played by the faculty as a body.  
Reinforcing this idea—and this is Yeshiva’s second 
theme—the Court repeatedly stressed the importance of 
collegiality. “[A]uthority in the typical ‘mature’ private 
university,” the Court explained, is split between the 
administration and “one or more collegial bodies.” Id. at 680. 
The Court observed that “[t]he Board itself has noted that the 
concept of collegiality ‘does not square with the traditional 
authority structures with which th[e] [NLRA] was designed to 
cope,’” and that “traditions of collegiality continue to play a 
significant role at many universities.” Id. (second alteration in 
original) (quoting Adelphi University, 195 N.L.R.B. 639, 648 
(1972)). 
The Board’s subgroup majority status rule is unfaithful to 
this critical aspect of Yeshiva. It ignores the possibility that 
faculty subgroups, despite holding different status within the 
university, may share common interests and therefore 
effectively participate together as a body on some or all of the 
21
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issues relevant to managerial status. It is entirely plausible that, 
for example, non-tenure-track faculty, especially full-time non-
tenure-track faculty, would agree with tenure-track faculty on 
questions of course offerings, academic integrity, and grading 
policies. Yet the Board’s subgroup majority status rule 
presupposes that non-tenure-track faculty have no authority 
over such matters unless they constitute a majority of the 
relevant committee. Of course, the interests of some minority 
faculty subgroups may differ from the majority on certain 
issues, such as with respect to promotion and salary. That, 
however, is precisely where the concept of collegiality comes 
into play. Disregarding this fundamental characteristic of 
university governance, the Board’s subgroup majority status 
rule assumes that minority subgroups can never work out their 
differences with the majority.  
Taken together, these two themes of Yeshiva—a focus on 
the faculty as a body and an emphasis on collegiality—
demonstrate that the question the Board must ask is not whether 
a particular subgroup can force policies through based on crude 
headcounts, but rather whether that subgroup is structurally 
included within a collegial faculty body to which the university 
has delegated managerial authority. This reading finds support 
in Yeshiva’s third theme: the Court’s guidance on how the 
Board should approach situations where the faculty members 
seeking recognition constitute a subgroup, such as in this case 
(non-tenure-track) and in Pacific Lutheran (contingent). 
Employees, the Court explained, may not be considered 
management and thus excluded from the NLRA’s coverage if 
their “decisionmaking is limited to the routine discharge of 
professional duties in projects to which they have been 
assigned.” Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690. Indeed, the Court noted 
that there may have been “faculty members at Yeshiva” itself 
“who properly could be included in a bargaining unit.” Id. at 
690 n.31. For example, “a rational line could be drawn between 
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tenured and untenured faculty members, depending upon how 
a faculty is structured and operates.” Id. Put another way, the 
question the Board must ask is not a numerical one—does the 
subgroup seeking recognition comprise a majority of a 
committee—but rather a broader, structural one: has the 
university included the subgroup in a faculty body vested with 
managerial responsibilities? To answer this question, the Board 
must, as required by Yeshiva, examine how the faculty is 
“structured” and “operates,” as well as the duties employees 
have been “assigned.” For example, as in Yeshiva, does the 
university “require” faculty members to participate in 
committees? If this analysis demonstrates that the subgroup 
seeking recognition is structurally part of a faculty body to 
which the university has delegated managerial authority, then, 
apart from several exceptions we shall discuss below, that ends 
the matter: the subgroup is managerial regardless of whether its 
members constitute a majority of the relevant committees or 
whether they even participate at all.  
Two additional considerations support this understanding 
of Yeshiva.  
First, the Court relied on a line of Board decisions from the 
private sector holding that it is possible for minority employee 
shareholders “who owned enough stock to give them, as a 
group, a substantial voice in the employer’s affairs”  to exercise 
effective control, even absent majority control. Yeshiva, 444 
U.S. at 685 n.21. Indeed, the Board itself has recognized that it 
“has excluded groups of shareholder-employees from 
bargaining units even though they collectively owned less than 
half of the employers’ stock.” Upper Great Lakes Pilots, Inc., 
311 N.L.R.B. 131, 132 n.9 (1993). Although the Board cites 
these cases in its brief while discussing this very issue, it fails 
to acknowledge their inconsistency with its subgroup majority 
status rule.  
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Second, and quite apart from Yeshiva, we just cannot see 
how the subgroup majority status rule will work. As USC 
notes, “the make-up of a particular committee will necessarily 
change from year to year. If only the majority category is 
managerial, then from one year to the next, different categories 
of perfectly managerial faculty could be deemed non-
managerial for no other reason than a one- or two-person swing 
on a committee roster.” Petitioner’s Br. 38. In his dissent, 
Member Miscimarra pointed out that, under the subgroup 
majority status rule, slicing and dicing the faculty in different 
ways—by tenure status, school, seniority, etc.—may allow 
“even faculty who indisputably exercise managerial authority” 
to qualify as non-managerial. USC, 365 N.L.R.B. at *4 & n.7 
(Miscimarra, Member, dissenting). In its amicus brief, the 
American Council on Education likewise warns that “any 
group of faculty can be sub-divided until it no longer 
commands a majority.” ACE Br. 27. The subgroup majority 
status rule contributes to this strategic division of faculties; 
Yeshiva’s structural approach avoids it. 
That said, whether an individual subgroup possesses a 
majority of committee seats is not always irrelevant. Quite to 
the contrary, determining whether a subgroup holds a decisive 
bloc of committee seats may be necessary where a subgroup’s 
interests fundamentally diverge from those of the majority. 
Although the Court in Yeshiva emphasized the value of faculty 
collegiality, there may well be issues on which the interests of 
the subgroup and the faculty as a whole differ so significantly 
that they cannot be reconciled even through collegial 
compromise. Under such circumstances, which the Board can 
identify only through a careful analysis of how the faculty 
seeking recognition actually functions, the Board might 
appropriately conclude that the subgroup cannot exercise 
effective control unless it constitutes a majority of the relevant 
committees. Likewise, if a subgroup that the university expects 
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to participate in a committee nonetheless fails to do so, this may 
signal the presence of structural barriers to that group’s 
participation. In this case, for example, the Board may well be 
correct that there is something about the status of non-tenure-
track faculty, especially part-time non-tenure-track, that 
effectively silences any managerial “voice,” Pacific Lutheran, 
361 N.L.R.B. at 1423, that such faculty otherwise might 
possess. See Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 690 n.31 (acknowledging that 
“other factors not present here,” such as tenure status, “may 
enter into the analysis in other contexts”).  
To be sure, the Pacific Lutheran framework accounts for 
these factors (diverging interests and the nature of non-tenure-
track employment). See 361 N.L.R.B. at 1421–22 (looking at 
the “nature of the employment relationship,” including 
“tenured vs. tenure eligible vs. nontenure eligible”). But 
Pacific Lutheran, as interpreted by the Board in this case, runs 
afoul of Yeshiva by using these factors as part of a 
determination focused on whether the petitioning subgroup 
alone exercises effective control. The Board should instead, as 
required by Yeshiva, think of this analysis as having two 
distinct inquiries: whether a faculty body exercises effective 
control and, if so, whether, based on the faculty’s structure and 
operations, the petitioning subgroup is included in that 
managerial faculty body. Only as part of the latter analysis 
should the Board dig into whether a subgroup’s actual interests 
diverge so substantially from those championed by the rest of 
the faculty that holding a minority of seats on the relevant 
committees is akin to having no managerial role at all, or 
whether a subgroup’s low participation rates stem from a 
tenuous employment relationship that vitiates any managerial 
role the university expects the subgroup to perform. See 
Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 674–77, 686 (examining closely the 
specific operations at Yeshiva).  
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Of course, the Board has flexibility over how to organize 
its analysis in any given case. In some situations, it might make 
sense to address these two inquiries sequentially: is there a 
managerial faculty body and, if so, is the petitioning subgroup 
a part of it? But in other situations, it may be unnecessary for 
the Board to consider whether a managerial faculty body exists 
because, even assuming one did, the petitioning subgroup is so 
clearly not included in it—because, for example, university 
rules prohibit its participation in committees. The critical point 
is this: however the Board proceeds, it must treat these two 
inquiries separately and may not conflate them by asking 
whether the petitioning subgroup alone exercises effective 
control.  
A final observation: in Pacific Lutheran, the Board 
emphasized that since the Court decided Yeshiva some four 
decades ago, universities “are increasingly run by 
administrators” and rely more and more on non-tenure-track 
faculty “who, unlike traditional faculty, have been appointed 
with no prospect of tenure and often no guarantee of 
employment.” Pacific Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1422. 
According to the Board, these trends “ha[ve] the effect of 
concentrating and centering authority away from the faculty.” 
Id. Building on this point, amicus American Association of 
University Professors points out that “[r]ather than relying on 
faculty expertise and recommendations, the growing ranks of 
administrators increasingly make unilateral decisions on 
university policies and programs, often influenced by 
considerations of external market forces and revenue 
generation.” American Association of University Professors’ 
Br. 10. By contrast, the American Council on Education, 
though acknowledging these trends, emphasizes “the continued 
primacy of shared governance.” ACE Br. 13. This is an 
interesting debate, and it may even be relevant. Regardless of 
national trends, however, the Board must not lose sight of the 
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fact that the question before it in any case in which a faculty 
subgroup seeks recognition is whether that university has 
delegated managerial authority to a faculty body and, if so, 
whether the petitioning faculty subgroup is a part of that body. 
As we explained in Point Park, this requires “an exacting 
analysis of the particular institution and faculty at issue.” 457 
F.3d at 48 (emphasis added). 
Having thus concluded that the Board’s subgroup majority 
status rule runs afoul of Yeshiva, we turn to USC’s challenge 
to Pacific Lutheran’s standard for “effective” control.  
III.  
Recall that Pacific Lutheran announced the following 
standard for determining when faculty exercise effective 
control over decision making: “[T]o be ‘effective,’ 
recommendations must almost always be followed by the 
administration. Further, faculty recommendations are 
‘effective’ if they routinely become operative without 
independent review by the administration.” 361 N.L.R.B. at 
1421 (internal citations and footnote omitted). Filling a gap left 
by the Board in Pacific Lutheran, the Regional Director 
required that both elements—“almost always” followed and 
“routinely” adopted “without independent review”—must be 
satisfied to support an effective control finding. USC, 365 
N.L.R.B. at *15. USC does not challenge the Regional 
Director’s conjunctive interpretation. Instead, drawing from 
the Pacific Lutheran dissents, the university argues that “there 
is no . . . logical conclusion” other than that the Pacific 
Lutheran standard, as interpreted in USC, resurrects the 
“ultimate authority” requirement for managerial status that 
Yeshiva forbids. Petitioner’s Br. 33 (emphasis omitted); see 
also Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 685 & nn.20–21.  
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In Yeshiva, the Court held that, in order to qualify as 
managerial, faculty must exercise “effective recommendation 
or control” over central university policies. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 
at 683 n.17. The Yeshiva faculty met that standard, the Court 
found, because their control was “substantial[] and 
pervasive[]”: among other things, the faculty “decide[d] [what] 
students will be admitted, retained, and graduated,” “decide[d] 
what courses will be offered,” and “determine[d] teaching 
methods, grading policies, and matriculation standards.” Id. at 
679, 686. The Court also explained that faculty need not have 
“final authority” in order to enjoy managerial status; a “rarely 
exercised veto power” held by the administration “does not 
diminish the faculty’s effective power.” Id at 683 n.17, 685. 
We see nothing in the Board’s two-part standard for 
“effective” control that runs afoul of Yeshiva. Although USC 
argues otherwise, the Board’s standard does not require 
“ultimate authority.” Quite to the contrary, its use of the phrase 
“almost always” allows for occasional, or as the Court put it, 
“rarely exercised,” vetoes. The word “routine” likewise leaves 
room for some administrative review. True, the standard is 
demanding, but it comports with Yeshiva, and we agree with 
the Board that setting a high bar for effective control is 
necessary to avoid interpreting the managerial exception so 
broadly that it chips away at the NLRA’s protections. See 
Pacific Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1419 n.32 (“[W]e are 
mindful of the fundamental principle that ‘exemptions from 
[the NLRA’s] coverage are not so expansively interpreted as to 
deny protection to workers the [NLRA] was designed to 
reach.’” (quoting Holly Farms Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 517 U.S. 392, 
399 (1996))). That said, the Board must be careful to apply its 
effective control standard with sensitivity to the notion of 
“collegial managerial authority that the Supreme Court 
recognized in Yeshiva.” USC, 365 N.L.R.B. at *3 (Miscimarra, 
Member, dissenting). “[T]raditions of collegiality continue to 
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play a significant role at many universities,” Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 
at 680, and the Board’s test for effective control must 
accommodate these traditions.   
USC complains about a stray sentence in the Regional 
Director’s opinion: “I am not convinced by the conclusory 
evidence in the record that the Board of Trustees, for example, 
would sign off without second thought on a tuition amount or 
endowment payout based solely on the recommendation of a 
newly-formed faculty committee that had never before 
considered such issues.” USC, 365 N.L.R.B. at *17 (emphasis 
added). According to USC, requiring that the administration 
accept committee recommendations “without second thought” 
sets an even higher bar for effective control than the one we 
understand the Board to have established. Petitioner’s Br. 22. 
Were this characterization of the Regional Director’s decision 
accurate, we would share USC’s concerns. The Regional 
Director, however, never suggested that her “without second 
thought” statement amounted to a new requirement for 
establishing effective control. Instead, she made the statement 
in response to USC’s contention that the administration had in 
fact accepted the newly formed Committee on Finance and 
Enrollment’s recommendations on important financial matters 
“without second thought.”  
IV. 
 We can quickly dispose of USC’s remaining arguments.  
First, regarding Pacific Lutheran’s classification of the 
five decision-making areas as primary and secondary, USC 
acknowledges that Yeshiva affords the Board leeway to design 
these categories, but nonetheless argues that the Pacific 
Lutheran framework inappropriately relegates academic and 
personnel policies to secondary status while elevating finances 
to primary status. Justifying the classification, the Board 
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explained that the primary areas, more so than the secondary 
ones, touch the university as a whole, align faculty with 
management, and affect the “product” the university offers—
all considerations taken from the Court’s discussion in Yeshiva. 
Pacific Lutheran, 361 N.L.R.B. at 1420; see also Yeshiva, 444 
U.S. at 675–77, 686, 690. Although we can imagine different 
groupings of these factors, nothing in Yeshiva dictates the 
outcome one way or the other, and the Board’s categorization 
falls well within its discretion under the NLRA. Indeed, this is 
precisely the type of line-drawing that the Board is “entitled” 
to make “without our constant second-guessing.” N.L.R.B. v. 
Kentucky River Community Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 720 
(2001).  
USC next argues that, by leaving open exactly how many 
of the five decision-making areas over which faculty must 
exercise control in order to qualify as managerial, Pacific 
Lutheran fails to satisfy this court’s instruction in LeMoyne-
Owen that it identify “which factors are significant and which 
less so, and why.” 357 F.3d at 61. We disagree. At the time of 
LeMoyne-Owen, the Board was engaging in a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis that we feared might be nothing more 
than “a cloak for agency whim.” Id. In response, the Board 
developed the Pacific Lutheran framework, which provides 
detailed standards for effective control, five precisely 
articulated decision-making areas, a list of the relevant factors 
within each area, and a prioritization of the areas. True, the 
Board could have been more precise, but nothing in LeMoyne-
Owen requires it to have done so, especially because 
managerial status determinations “do[] not lend [themselves] 
to ex ante line drawing or a mathematical exercise in box 
checking.” Respondent’s Br. 39. 
Finally, USC argues that, even if the Pacific Lutheran 
framework complies with Yeshiva, the Board’s classification of 
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the Roski non-tenure-track faculty as non-managerial was 
unsupported by substantial evidence. Relatedly, USC argues 
that the Regional Director erred in denying its motion to reopen 
the record concerning allegedly contradictory testimony from 
a Union witness. But given our conclusion that the Board’s 
subgroup majority status rule runs afoul of Yeshiva, and 
because we are uncertain whether the Board would have 
reached the same conclusion absent that rule, we think it best 
to leave these arguments unaddressed and to instead give the 
Board an opportunity to reconsider the case afresh under the 
proper legal standard. See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Civil 
Aeronautics Board, 379 F.2d 453, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 
(remanding to the agency because the “court [wa]s in 
substantial doubt whether the administrative agency would 
have made the same ultimate finding with the erroneous 
findings or inferences removed from the picture” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 
granted in part, the Board’s cross-application for enforcement 
is denied, and the case is remanded to the Board for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We, of course, 
express no opinion as to whether the application of the differing 
standard on remand would lead to the same or a different result. 
 
So ordered. 
31
et al.: Panel: Shared Governance and Collective Bargaining following Janu
Published by The Keep, 2019
